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INTRODUCTION

Oil spills leave more than an environmental mess in their wake.
They usually leave a mess of litigants and court dockets jammed with
lawsuits filed by private and public parties, making claims for damages based upon a myriad of theories of liability. This article discusses
the types of private parties who bring lawsuits after an oil spill, and
the grounds for their suits.
Cleaning oil-fouled beaches and restoring natural resources damaged by an oil spill are typically functions of state and federal governments. Still, beach owners, users of beaches, sport and commercial
fishermen, and businesses often claim to have suffered damages after
an oil spill. Thus, private party litigation plays an important role in
oil spill cleanup.
This article also overviews both the types of damages private parties seek and the federal environmental laws with citizen suit provisions under which private litigants may sue. Most federal environmenhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/5
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tal laws do not allow parties to recover private damages. Rather,
available federal statutes allow private parties to bring suit to enforce
environmental laws when the government does not enforce those
laws. 1 Usually, private party claims for damages are brought by property owners, businesses, and fishermen who have suffered direct physical or economic effects from an oil spill.
Most of the remedies available to private plaintiffs suing for environmental damages derive from the common law.2 Other causes of action available to private parties arise from state oil spill liability laws.3
Part II sets the stage for this article through the Exxon Valdez
oil spill. This oil spill, which occurred in 1989 in Alaska's Prince William Sound, led to several legal developments. Congress, for example,
reacted by passing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).4 Litigants
flocked to courts around the country, causing jurists and litigants to
reevaluate the theories and limitations to oil spill lawsuits.5
Part III of this article sets forth various theories of recovery included in private party lawsuits filed after oil spills. The primary
causes of action alleged by private parties suing after an oil spill include nuisance, trespass, negligence, and statutory strict liability.
Part IV examines several categories of private party plaintiffs
who may potentially file lawsuits after an oil spill. Typical private
party plaintiffs suing for damages after an oil spill include fishermen,
beach property owners, recreational users, and businesses that claim
adverse effects by an oil spill.
Part V discusses the types of damages claimed by private party
plaintiffs. Besides direct compensatory damages, these private parties
may claim damages to their real property, reduced income, and incidental, emotional, and punitive damages.
Part VI describes relevant federal environmental laws, notably
the Clean Water Act (CWA)6 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 7 with
provisions that authorize private parties to sue to enforce the laws on
behalf of the government.8 Congress passed most of these federal laws
1. See, e.g., The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387 (Law Co-op. 1987 &
Supp. 1991), Part VI(B).
2. See infra Part III.

3. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1991) (Alaska's statute providing for strict
liability for oil spill damages).
4. See infra Part VII(C).
5. Parties filed Exxon Valdez oil spill-related lawsuits in Alaska, Washington,
New York, California, Florida, and District of Columbia courts. See infra notes 16-22
and accompanying text.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Law. Co-op 1988 & Supp. 1991). See infra Part VII(C).
8. See infra Part VII(C). See also discussions of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 43 U.S.C.S. §§ 1651-1656 (Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991),
which allowed private parties to recover for damages for Trans-Alaska Pipeline oil
spills, infra, Part VIII(A).
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over the last twelve years. Of these laws, only the OPA allows private
parties to receive compensation for oil spill damages.
Part VII reviews both salient federal laws and judicial decisions
that limit private damage claims. The key statute limiting an oil
spiller's liability is the federal Limitation of Liability Act (LLA).O The
0
articulated
seminal case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint"
for maridamage
claims
private
party
the common law's limitation on
time torts when there is no physical impact or injury.
Part VIII reviews three Alaska cases resulting from oil spills in
Alaska: Glacier Bay I," Glacier Bay 11,12 and Exxon Valdez. 3 Each
case occurred before passage of the OPA. Each contains common law
claims for damages and limitations of liability analysis. In addition,
each contains discussions of federal law that are relevant to private
party lawsuits.
Part IX concludes that private parties have a variety of legal theories available to bring a claim against an oil-spilling defendant.
Plaintiffs should not ignore the opportunity to present oil spill damage claims directly to the oil spiller. Formal or informal discussions
and out-of-court, pre-litigation settlements in lieu of litigation avoid
what may be a long, tedious, expensive and unsatisfactory legal process in favor of a quick settlement with the spiller. The spiller may
also benefit from these pre-litigation (or non-litigation) settlements by
avoiding (or minimizing) additional or continuing unfavorable publicity that usually accompanies an oil spill.
II. THE 1989 EXXON

VALDEZ OIL SPILL

On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez went aground on
Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The grounding resulted
in the release of about 10 million gallons of Trans-Alaska Pipeline
North Slope crude oil.' 4 The Exxon Valdez oil spill became the largest tanker oil spill in United States waters. After that oil spill, the
federal government filed criminal charges against the Exxon defend-

9. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-195 (1988).
10. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).

11. In re Glacier Bay, 741 F. Supp. 800 (D. Alaska 1990), aff'd 944 F.2d 577 (9tb
Cir. 1991); see infra Part VIII(B).
12. In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990); see infra notes 222-34
Part VIII(C).
13. In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991); see infra Part
VIII(D).
14. A great deal has already been written about the Exxon Valdez spill and will
not be repeated here. For a detailed account of the spill, the response and the aftermath, see ART DAVIDSON, IN THE WAKE OF THE Exxon Valdez (1990). While the Exxon
Valdez was the largest spill by an oil tanker in United States waters, the Exxon
Valdez spill was far from the largest oil spill. The following are the top ten oil spills
between 1967 and 1989:
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ants.'" In addition, thousands of plaintiffs filed hundreds of lawsuits
against Exxon defendants, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, and
others, seeking damages resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill.16
Litigants seeking a variety of damages also filed lawsuits against
Exxon defendants in Washington, D.C.,' 7 California, 8 New York,'8
RANK
1

DATE
1979-80

2

1983

3

1983

4

1978

5

1979

6

1980-81

7

1979

8

1967

SPILL
Ixtoc I, Well
Blowout
Nowruz Oil Field,

LOCATION
Mexico
Persian

Well Blowout(s)

Gulf

Casillo de
Beliver/Broke,

South
Africa

50-80

France

67-76

off Tobago

49

Libya

42

Barbados

41.5

England

35.7-38.6

Greece

12.3-36.6

Sea Star/

Gulf of

35.3

Collision, Fire

Oman

VOLUME*
139-428
80-185

Fire

Amoco
Cadiz/Grounding
Aegean
Captain/Atlantic
Empress

D-103 Libya, Well
Blowout
Atlantic
Empress/Fire
Torrey
Canyon/Grounding

9

1980

Irenes
Serenade/Fire

10

1972

in millions of gallons
UNITED

STATES

CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COPING WITH AN OILED

SEA; AN ANALYSIS OF OIL SPILL RESPONSE TECHNOLOGIES 4 (Mar. 1990) (available from
the United States Printing Office in Washington, D.C., # OTA-BP-0-63). The Exxon
Valdez oil spill ranks 35th on this list. Id. In the first half of 1991, oil tankers spilled
seven times the amount spilled in all of 1990 and twice the amount spilled in 1989. See
Alan Abrams, '91 Oil Spills Worst in Decade, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 25, 1991,
at C1. About 425,000 tons of oil had already been spilled from various sources in the
first half of 1991. Id.
15. United States District Court Judge H. Russell Holland rejected a plea bargain
between Exxon defendants and the United States concerning criminal fines, and subsequently the guilty plea in the criminal case was withdrawn. Judge Rejects $100M
Exxon Criminal Plea Bargain, 3 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS 3057 (1991). On October 8,
1991, Judge Holland approved a subsequent plea agreement. In addition, Exxon defendants, the State of Alaska and the federal government settled their civil litigation.
Court Accepts State-Federal Pact With Exxon Defendants, 3 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS
3795, 3807-26 (1991).
16. The Federal District Court for the District of Alaska indicates that roughly
190 cases have been filed in that court, which have between 5,500 and 6,000 plaintiffs.
Telephone Interview with Mr. Tom Murtiashaw, Docket Clerk, United States District
Court for the District of Alaska (April 7, 1992). The State of Alaska, Anchorage Superior Court indicates that 212 cases have been filed in state court, which involve about
3,248 plaintiffs. Telephone Interview with Ms. Diane Alford, Legal Technician,
Anchorage Trial Court Administration (April 7, 1992). Both Mr. Murtiashaw and Ms.
Alford indicated that it is very difficult to know with certainty the number of plaintiffs
involved in these lawsuits because of the myriad types of lawsuits that have been filed
(e.g., class actions, shareholder derivative actions, individual lawsuits, etc.).
17. See, e.g., Native Village of Chenega Bay v. Lujan, No. 91-5042, 1991 WL 40471
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Washington, 2" and Florida.2 ' Even Alabama showed an interest in this
Alaska oil spill.22
III.

COMMON LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS

There are four primary legal theories that private parties typically may assert when making claims for damages to private property.
These theories are trespass, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability.
After an oil spill, each of these theories probably will be set forth by
private party plaintiffs.2 3 A party seeking oil spill damages usually
pleads one or all of the following actions: (1) causes of action contained in statutes such as strict liability statutes; (2) negligence per se
as found in statutes or regulations; (3) common law negligence; (4)
common law trespass to property; and (5) common law nuisance.
A.

Nuisance

A nuisance cause of action requires the plaintiff to prove an unreasonable and substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
land.24 This may include impacts on scenery and on the sensitivities of
property owners."e The burden of proving nuisance is fairly high, and
tangible impacts may have to be shown on the use and enjoyment of
plaintiff's property before the plaintiff sets forth a valid claim. Therefore, simply because an oil spill affects aesthetic values, a court may
not recognize such a claim.2" An oil spill in a pristine area is more
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 1991) (several Alaska native villages seeking stay of federal government's settlement with Exxon for spill damages); Native Village of Chenega Bay v.
Lujan, No. 91-483, 1992 WL 26014 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1992).
18. See, e.g., Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., No. 90-56055, 1992 WL 54005 (9th Cir. Mar.
24, 1992), affg, No. CV 90-2184, 1990 WL 180503 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 1990) (class action suit by California motorists seeking damages over rise in gasoline prices after the
Exxon Valdez oil spill); see infra note 266-69 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Rawl, 755 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (shareholders
suit against Exxon officers and directors over Exxon Valdez oil spill).
20. See, e.g., All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. C90-1598 (W.D.
Wash. 1990) (seafood processor seeking damages from Exxon Valdez oil spill).
21. See, e.g., Allapattah Serv. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 91-0986 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(suit by Exxon retailers for lost business because of alleged failure by Exxon to maintain good public image after the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
22. Motion to File Amicus Brief, In re Exxon Valdez, (D. Alaska 1990) (A89095CI) (motion by Alabama Attorney General to file amicus statement on the ability
to enforce the state water pollution control statute and on the issue that federal maritime common law does not preempt state oil pollution protection laws).
23. Thomas R. Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private Compensation in Oil
Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 524, 527 (1974).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977) (private nuisance is nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in private use and enjoyment of land). For a
thorough discussion of nuisance, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616-27 (5th ed. 1984).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 832 (1977); KEETON, supra note 24, at
627-28.
26. See Mathewson v. Primeau, 395 P.2d 183, 189 (Wash. 1964); see also Allison v.
Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (junkyard held nuisance); Charles J.
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likely to be considered a nuisance than an oil spill in an area subject
to many oil spills that does not have undisturbed visual qualities."
This is because, under all the surrounding circumstances, an oil spill
in the pristine area may be an unreasonable and substantial interference to a property owner's use and enjoyment of that property. However, an oil spill in a heavily industrialized area with a history of unsightly pollution may not be an 2 8unreasonable and substantial
interference with use and enjoyment.
The two types of nuisance actions a private party may bring are
public nuisance and private nuisance. 29 A public nuisance affects the
public in general and the government usually brings an action to
abate it.30 A private party usually brings an individual action or restraining orders to abate a private nuisance." In cases of public nuisance, individuals usually do not obtain a remedy unless they suffer
some particular harm.2 In general, individual state statutes now address actions for public nuisance and have replaced common law nuisance actions."
Courts consider commercial fisheries affected by an oil spill to be
distinct from other types of groups and thus have awarded compensation to commercial fishermen on nuisance grounds. 34 Losses by an entire community 3' affected by an oil spill "nuisance" are only a "comDoane, Comment, Beyond Fear: Anticipating a Modern Doctrine in Anticipatory
Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 BC. ENVTL
AFF. L. REV. 441, 448-52 (1990).

27. See Allison, 695 P.2d at 794.
28. Id.
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821D (1977); KEETON, supra
note 24, §§ 87, 90.
30. KEETON, supra note 24, § 90, at 643; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B
(1977).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1977).

32. Id. § 821C cmt. a; KEETON, supra note 24, § 90, at 646.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1977). For example, Alaska
law describes "nuisance" at ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.45.230.250 (1983). The following are a

number of cases that address claims made for nuisance in the context of oil or chemical spills. Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 596, 603-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (state may recover damages in a public nuisance
action); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (party
may recover in nuisance even when no tangible or physical impact on plaintiffs property); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J.
1985) (economic loss damages available even if no physical damages suffered if plaintiff knew or had reason to know defendants were likely to suffer); Biddix v. Henredon
Furniture Indus., Inc., 331 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (statutory provisions regarding water pollution do not preempt common law, nuisance, or trespass actions);
New Jersey Transp. Dep't v. PSC Resources, Inc., 419 A.2d 1151 (N.J. Super. 1980)
(oil waste discharge into lake is nuisance as abnormally dangerous activity and liability
is absolute).
34. See, e.g., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d. 538 (N.C. 1943)
(long-time, in-river fisherman made a claim for special damages under nuisance when
pulp mill destroyed his business).
35. Examples of businesses suffering community losses include beachfront hotels,
restaurants, gas stations, and drug stores. These businesses may have problems filling
employee slots because oil spill cleanup contractors diminish the labor pool.
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mon misfortune." 3 Therefore, they should not expect to obtain
37
compensation for lost profits or reduced incomes after an oil spill.
However, there have been cases where beachfront owners who had
property affected by oil pollution, and who were precluded from fishing, swimming, boating, or "enjoying" their property could recover
under a theory of nuisance because they suffered particular
damages."
When an oil spill causes interference with maritime property
(such as beachfront property), admiralty and common law courts permit nuisance actions. 39 A plaintiff who establishes that a nuisance exists may seek damage remedies, equitable relief, or abatement." Normally, the measure of damages to property is the depreciation in the
market value. 4' Where the damages are not permanent, a private
party may seek depreciation in the rental or use of the property while
the nuisance existed, plus any damages the plaintiff may incur during
the period of the nuisance, such as inconvenience in using the propor any illness the plaintiff suffered that was
erty, relocation costs,
4
caused by the spill. 1
B.

Trespass

Trespass is the physical invasion of property." In order to successfully bring a trespass action, a plaintiff must prove a direct physical invasion of the plaintiff's property. Therefore, a trespass claim is
more suitable for plaintiffs who can prove that oil washed up on their
beach." Many damage claims made on a nuisance theory can also be
made under trespass, including loss of business profits due to property

36. See Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973), holding that
fishermen plaintiffs have a direct economic injury and can recover following a tanker
spill of 100,000 gallons of bunker oil. However, beach businessmen (such as tourist
trade-related businesses) did not show damages distinct from the public at large and
were thus denied recovery. Id. at 251.
37. Id. For example, after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, many workers in Valdez
were hired by firms contracted to assist in the cleanup of the oil spill. These cleanup
contractors offered higher wages to their employees than some other businesses in

Valdez such as gas stations and restaurants. Consequently, those businesses which
could not compete with the cleanup contractors for labor allegedly suffered an inability
to hire employees. This affected their ability to effectively serve the public, which in
turn, according to some, led to reduced profits. See, e.g., Allapattah Serv. Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., No. 91-0986 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
38. See infra Part IV(E) (damage claims by beach owners and users).
39. See People v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
40. Keeton, supra note 24, § 88, at 637.
41. Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 542 N.E.2d 402, 409 (Il. App. Ct. 1989);
Adams v. Arkansas City, 362 P.2d 829, 838-40 (Kan. 1961).
42. KEETON, supra note 24, § 89, at 638-39.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 157-164 (1964) (definition of trespass
on land).
44. See Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 383 S.E.2d 392 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (common
law cause of action for trespass still available under comprehensive statutory anti-pollution scheme).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/5
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damage.
C.

5

Negligence

Negligence is the most common cause of action brought by private plaintiffs for damage to private property. To prevail in a negligence action, plaintiffs must prove that an oil spiller had a duty to
exercise a standard of care, breached that duty, and proximately
caused damages. As either the danger of an activity or the activity's
potential to cause4 harm increases, the degree of care that must be exercised increases.

Private parties affected by an oil spill usually prefer negligence as
their first cause of action because of the breach of a duty to carry oil
in a reasonably safe manner.4 7 In addition to pleading common law
negligence, plaintiffs may turn to state or federal laws which specifically provide for liability of negligent defendants.," Further, a party
may plead negligence per se if a statute defines a standard of reasonable conduct and a spiller acts outside the standard prescribed.4 9
D.

Strict Liability

Statutes may provide strict liability for damages by an oil
spiller.50 The transportation of oil may be deemed to be "abnormally
dangerous," "inherently dangerous," or "ultrahazardous" and thus
give rise to strict liability.5 ' In general, a plaintiff recovering oil spill

damages under a strict liability statute can recover damages from the
oil spiller even though there was no negligence involved in the spill.
Both the OPA and state laws provide for instances of recovery to pri45. Trespass also is interference with a property owner's use of land. See KEETON,
supra note 24, § 13, at 70.
46. The question of what is an "inherently dangerous activity" is mentioned by
several courts and commentators. The rule of what constitutes an inherently dangerous activity "applies equally to work which, although not highly dangerous, involves a
risk recognizable in advance that danger inherent in the work itself, or in the ordinary
or prescribed way of doing it, may cause harm to others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 427 cmt. c (1964). Inherently dangerous activities must present foreseeable
and significant risks of harm to others if not carefully conducted. See Western Stock
Center, Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 578 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1978).
47. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text for causes of action and legal
theories available to various plaintiffs.
48. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991); 33 U.S.C. § 2702
(Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1964); KEETON, supra note 24, § 36,
at 220-31. In other words, if no excuse exists, the courts presume negligence if they
find a statute designed to protect the plaintiff against the harm that occurred. Causation and damages must still be proven. Id. at 229-30.
50. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822.
51. The Restatement provides that "[o]ne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another
resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1976).
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vate parties from oil spill damages based on strict liability.52
IV.

POTENTIAL PRIVATE PARTY PLAINTIFFS

There are many private parties that could file suits for damages
after an oil spill. The number and types of private parties suing after
an oil spill probably will depend on the size and scope of the spill,
who spilled the oil, who owned the oil, and, if a tanker spills oil, what
company's name was on the tanker spilling the oil. 3 The types of potential private parties discussed here are not exhaustive and are only
intended to exemplify various categories of plaintiffs who may be expected to file suits after an oil spill. In addition, enumeration of these
plaintiffs and their claims does not indicate that the claims have merit
or that these plaintiffs could prevail in bringing their claims.
A.

Tourist Industry

Tourist booking agents may sue for the loss of business caused by
a decline in the number of tourists coming to coastal areas affected by
an oil spill. 4 These plaintiffs would be "indirect" plaintiffs. 55 Courts
probably would find that tourist industry litigants suffer only a "common misfortune" or "general misfortune," not specific injury, and
therefore could not recover damages."
B.

Waterfowl Guides and Photographers

Oil spills along a flyway or in a waterfowl nesting area may lead
to diminished populations of waterfowl species. Waterfowl hunting
guides or photographers might bring claims for damages resulting
52. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
53. Many of the claims discussed in this section seem very remote, yet they are
the types of claims private parties might bring after an oil spill, depending on the size
and scope of the spill and the name of the party who spilled the oil (e.g., a "big oil"
company vs. small operator). So too will the location of a spill dictate the vigor of
litigation. It is probably more likely that a large oil company will be sued longer,
harder, and more often, than, say, "Bob's Oil Transport Company."
54. See Burgess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973).
55. In a claim for damages resulting from the tanker World Prodigy oil spill on
July 23, 1989 in Narraganset Bay, Rhode Island, Barbara and Richard Zacharczyp
sued the tanker owner on the basis of negligence and strict liability (claiming the
tanker was an inherently dangerous instrumentality containing a hazardous substance). See In the Matter of Ballard Shipping Co., No. 89-0685 (D.R.I. Sept. 17,
1991). The Zacharczyps claimed they suffered harm because they were neither able to
enjoy their vacation home near the spill nor host a party they had planned for 25
invited guests on June 25, 1989, two days after the spill. The Zacharczyps claimed that
the oil spill ruined their vacation and they sought damages for the wages lost when
they took time off for vacation, the rent of the vacation home, and the unused food
which they could not use during their vacation. See Claim of Damages of Barbara and
Richard Zacharczyp in re Complaint of Ballard Shipping Company for Exoneration
From or Limitation of Liability, No. 89-0685L, (D.R.I. Mar. 5, 1990) reprinted in 2 OIL
SPILL LITIG. NEWS 1803 (1990).

56. See supra note 36. See also infra note 198.
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from reduced business (i.e., reduced number of guide trips due to cancellations). This group, too, would suffer only a general harm and
probably would have difficulty recovering damagesY
C.

Sportfishermen and Sport Hunters

An oil spill might result in closures of sport fisheries or a reduced
harvest of game in an area. This would reduce the number of sport
opportunities and, consequently, would reduce the number of sport
hunters and sportfishermen. These parties may bring claims for lost
opportunities to hunt and fish. They also may bring claims against the
spiller for increased costs due to the need to purchase food if they
typically dined on fish and game obtained by their hunting and fishing efforts (like subsistence hunters and fishermen). Or, they may
bring claims for incidental costs if they traveled to alternative hunting
and fishing sites further away from the spill site."8 These parties likewise suffer only a general harm and probably could not recover
damages.
D. Natural Resource Developers in an Oil Spill Area

There are other rather esoteric claims that could be made against
an oil spiller by private parties.5" For example, developers of natural
resources may sue an oil spiller for bringing about an unexpected
change in regulatory climate because of the oil spill. In addition, if the
oil spill is large enough, the regional regulatory atmosphere, economic
base, or transportation networks may be generally disrupted. This disruption might lead to higher costs to developers. Those persons who
have sought to develop various projects in an area based on certain
scenarios may find those scenarios disrupted after an oil spill and,
consequently, may find problems in obtaining venture capital for their
project because of that disruption.e"
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Photographers sought damages in
In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1511 (D. Alaska 1991). The claim has not yet
been resolved.
58. Taxidermists who rely on sportfishermen for their business may bring a suit
against an oil spiller for a reduction in business. If they cannot stuff fish or game
because of the oil spill, they might claim economic damages against the spiller. Again,
this type of litigant would have a difficult time collecting damages.
59. These claims, in the author's opinion, might only be brought by parties
searching for a "deep pocket." See supra note 53.
60. Waterfield Eng'g Ass'n Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 3AN-90-3091 CI (Alaska Super.
Ct. 1990). In Waterfield Engg, a gold miner alleged that national news of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill caused apprehension on the part of investors plaintiff sought to assist
in developing mining claims in the area of the oil spill. Plaintiff claimed these investors then put their investments elsewhere. The plaintiff also alleged that oil spill
cleanup activities made "transportation facilities" (undefined in the complaint) unavailable to plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff argued that the oil spill caused environmentalists to give plaintiff's development permits greater scrutiny than if the spill had not
occurred. Id. The claim is unresolved as of this writing.
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Beach Property and Resort Owners and Users

Oil spilled offshore that drifts onto beaches would affect beach
owners and persons using beaches for recreation and for hunting, fishing and gathering activities." Operators of fishing lodges and resorts
are one type of private party that can be expected to bring claims for
oil spill damages if oil washes up on their beaches. The oil has the
potential to harm docks, boats and motors. This oil on beaches could
lead to visitor cancellations and fewer resources available to users of
beaches, such as beach combers, clam diggers and bathers. 2 So too
could resort owners make claims for damages if patrons refused to
come to their resort because of an oil spill, provided the resort owner
could prove damages.6 3
F.

Commercial Fishermen

Courts favor claims by commercial fishermen for economic damages incurred because of an oil spill. 4 Commercial fishermen may generally recover lost profits even though they do not have a property
61. See, e.g., Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 286 S.W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) (the operator of a resort that included a bathing pool in the channel of a river
was awarded damages for loss of patronage after the railroad company polluted the
river with oil).
62. Claim of Gooseberry Beach, Inc., CA-89-0685 (D.R.I. Mar. 2, 1990), reprinted
in 2 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS 1797 (1990). Gooseberry Beach, Inc. is a private corporation
which charges persons for parking of motor vehicles and use of beach facilities. On
June 23, 1989, the World Prodigy spilled oil in Narraganset Bay. According to the
Gooseberry Beach, Inc. complaint, the state of Rhode Island closed beaches to swimming for two days, which resulted in profit losses to the beach corporation. The beach
corporation based its claim on negligence and asked for lost income of $3,800 which
was calculated on the basis of average weekend receipts during the summer of 1989.
Another party sued the World Prodigy using the theories of negligence, inherently
dangerous instrumentality carrying a hazardous substance (an oil tanker), and strict
liability. This party claimed that it could neither use and enjoy its waterfront property
nor enjoy his daughter's wedding because of the overpowering stench from the oil spill.
See id. at 1801-02. See also 2 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS 1639 (1990) (condominium association near World Prodigy oil spill suing for loss of use and enjoyment of property,
condominium amenities, and the value of investment for the time the beach is rendered unusable due to oil presence).
63. See Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 21 So. 2d 463 (Miss. 1945) (owner of a fishing
resort on a river that was fed by a tributary defendant polluted could recover damages
if proven that the defendant depleted the fish resource around which her business
necessarily centered). Accord Maddox v. Int'l Paper Co., 105 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. La.
1951).
64. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Seaclammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981) (fishermen should look for injunctive relief and damages under state law,
not federal common law, in water pollution cases); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981); State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/N Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom. (commercial fishermen are entitled to damages from
Santa Barbara oil well blowout); White v. MNT Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.
1974) (commercial fishermen with reduced catch due to Santa Barbara oil spill blowout could recover lost profits); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va.
1981).
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interest in fish until they are caught." Commercial fisherman may
claim that an oil spill generally depressed their markets, leading to
reduced prices for the fish they do land, and lost income. Similarly, an
oil spill might close an area to fishing. Fishermen may then travel to
other distant fishing grounds. These fishermen may claim increased
expenses in going to the new fishing grounds, decreased catches because of inexperience in those grounds, or decreased catches because
of increased competition on those grounds. The fishermen might also
claim that there was more competition for a limited number of fish in
a smaller area because of the closed fishing grounds. 6
G.

Commercial Fish Processors

Fish processors in an oil spill area may bring claims for reduced
income because they would be processing and selling less fish. Like
fishermen, processors may face diminished prices from consumers
during, and perhaps after, an oil spill if the spill damages the reputation of seafood. Alternatively, processors may face difficulties in hiring
workers if competing oil spill cleanup firms hire those workers to work
on a cleanup. Consequently, the processor may have to pay a higher
would not
wage to those it does employ. These higher wages probably
67
have been necessary were it not for an oil spill cleanup.
H. Fishing Industry Employees
Workers employed by seafood processing facilities may bring lawsuits against an oil spiller if the workers are laid off because of closed
fishing seasons. Furthermore, fish processors may not even hire workers if an oil spill occurs before the fishing season. The worker may file
a claim against an oil spiller for lost wages, set off by necessary mitigation measures.

65. See Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.
1984) (vessel down time relating to poor product performance can allow fishermen to
recover pecuniary damages); Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813
(l1th Cir. 1984); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). See infra notes
179-98 and accompanying text.
66. See Allred v. Exxon Corp., 3HO-90-234 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1990). Allred
and others were commercial fishermen who claimed damage to their livelihood from
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The fishermen claimed that the oil spill damaged quality of
life and fishing opportunities. Fishermen sought damages based on Alaska's strict liability statutes, common law strict liability alleging that transportation of oil was an
abnormally dangerous and ultrahazardous activity and pleaded negligence, nuisance,
interference with prospective economic advantages, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages, and fees and
costs. 2 OIL SPILL LITIG. NEWS 1522 (1990). See also Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp
Co., 27 S.E. 2d 538 (1943) (owner of fishery in a stream has a cause of action for
special damages for injury to his business damages).
67. See, e.g. Allapattah Serv. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 91-0986 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
See also supra the accompanying text to note 21.
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I. Gear and Tackle Shops
Gear and tackle shops also may bring suits if fishermen cannot
fish in an area because of an oil spill. There would be less of a demand
for these suppliers' products, which in turn could lead to reduced
income. 8
V.

A.

PRIVATE PLAINTIFF DAMAGE CLAIMS

Compensatory

Compensatory damages is the major type of damage claimed by
private plaintiffs after an oil spill."9 Plaintiffs may seek damages for
inconvenience caused by contamination of their property by an oil
spill.7 0 Private parties may attempt to recover for the disruption in
their lives after an oil spill, particularly if they live in remote areas
and the oil spill prevents them from getting to and from their homes
by trail or skiff.
Fishing lodge and resort owners might bring compensatory claims
for damage to their beach property. The types of claims that these
property owners might bring are: loss of expected value, diminished
use and enjoyment of property, economic loss, and losses that an
owner may not realize until the owner attempts to sell the property.
For example, a prospective buyer may not want to pay a premium
price because the beach has been "oiled." Private beach property
owners also may attempt to bring a claim for tortious interference
with contractual expectancy in the event visitors cancel contracts for
68. Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 263 P.2d 705 (Idaho 1953) (owners of gro-

cery store partially built over a creek that defendant polluted were awarded damages
because smell from the waste drove away plaintiff's customers and caused a loss of
business). See generally Global Petroleum Corp. v. Northeast Petroleum, 539 N.E. 2d

1022 (Mass. 1989) (riverfront business denied economic business losses when river
blocked by collapsed retaining wall); Palumbo v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 487 N.E. 2d
546 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (restaurant owner denied economic damage losses when
bridge closed and shut off flow of customers).
69. See Andrew W. McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A Return to Principles of Corrective Justice in Deciding Economic Loss Cases, 69 VA_ L REV. 1517 (1983); David C.
McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response Costs: Accounting for the
True Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1001 (1987). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977)(compensatory damages replace the loss, or compensate for

the loss).
Plaintiffs may seek damages for the loss of the pleasure they obtained from living
in an unspoiled area. "Hedonic damages" compensate for the loss of life and pleasure
of living. See Tina M. Tabocchi, Note, Hedonic Damages:A New Trend in Compensa-

tion?, 52 OHIo ST_ L.J. 331 (1991). For additional discussions of hedonic damages see
Recent Case, New York Court of Appeals Denies Loss-of-Enjoyment Damages to Comatose Plaintiffs, 103 HARV. L. REV 811 (1990); Kyle R. Crowe, Note, The Semantical
Bifurcation of Noneconomic Loss: Should Hedonic Damages be Recognized Independently of Pain and Suffering Damage?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1275 (1990); Erin A. O'Hara,
Note, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away with

Murder?, 78 GEo. L.J. 1687 (1990).
70. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1211 (6th Cir. 1988).
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using a fishing lodge or resort. If the property owners participate in
beach cleanup activities, they may bring claims for damage to their
clothing and boats used in the cleanup.
B.

Emotional

Private parties may attempt to sue an oil spiller for emotional
damages. Claims for emotional damages may include damages caused
by apprehension, distress, or physical or visual exposure to harmful
fumes or substances. 7 1 Alleviation of 72the health risk would limit a
plaintiff's emotional distress damages.
C.

Punitive

Punitive damages may be awarded against an oil spiller if the
spill occurred because of outrageous, reckless, or malicious conduct.
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish a wrongdoer and deter
future oil spillers.73 To support a punitive damages claim, the outrageous conduct of an oil spiller must occur "with malice or bad motives
or a reckless indifference to the interests of another."7 4 Whether oil is
spilled with "malice" is a question of fact for the jury.75 In addition,
all the facts of the case must be considered before making an award of
punitive damages.7" Factors considered in determining punitive damages include the total amount of damages awarded, the type of offense, the wealth of defendant, and others."

VI. PRIVATE PARTY LAWSUITS BROUGHT UNDER FEDERAL LAW
During the past ten years, Congress adopted stiff federal environmental laws with provisions authorizing private citizens to bring suit
to enforce these laws. 78 Still, few of these federal laws allow citizens to
71. See the following examples for these types of emotional claims: Haggerty v. L
& L Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1986) (exposure to chemical dripolene); Herber v. Johns Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (fear of getting
cancer from breathing asbestos); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713
(N.D. Ill. 1978); Villari v. Terminex Int'l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987). See
also supra note 69 for a discussion of hedonic damages.
72. See Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164, 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1987), aff'd
856 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1988).
73. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Beadles, 731 P.2d 572, 574 (Alaska 1987). See
KEETON, supra note 24, §§ 9, 14.
74. Beadles, 731 P.2d at 574.
75. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 774 (Alaska 1982).
Negligence does not warrant an award of punitive damages. Beadles, 731 P.2d at 574
(citing Hayes v. Xerox, 718 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1986)). Courts cannot instruct juries to
award punitive damages as those awards are within the discretion of the trier of fact.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983).
76. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 908 (1977).
78. The federal laws described here are relevant to oil spills on marine waters.
This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of federal laws having

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 5
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVII

sue for private damages. Instead, when a party spills oil, federal law
provides a mechanism for citizens to sue the oil spiller if the government fails to enforce the law. 9 Thus, citizen suits under federal law
generally may result in enforcement of the federal law, but not in an
award of damages to a plaintiff."0
The latest oil spill-related legislation enacted by Congress, the
OPA, 81 continues the trend in federal environmental law of allowing
citizen suits to ensure enforcement and compliance of federal law.
However, the OPA differs in a significant way from earlier federal environmental laws like the CWA. s2 The OPA specifically allows private
parties to recover for damages to private property caused by a spill.83

citizen suit provisions. Other commentators discuss citizen suits under federal law in
more detail. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34
BUFF. L. REv. 833 (1985); Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages:
Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851 (1989);
Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1985); M. Casey Jarman, Marine Pollution:Injury Without a
Remedy?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV- 603 (1987); David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse
of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 175 (1991).

79. See, e.g., federal laws cited infra note 83.
80. For example, a plaintiff can sue to enforce provisions of the CWA, but not to
recover private damages. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
81. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 2701-2761 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
82. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1991).
83. Five other federal acts not discussed in detail here may be relevant in certain
oil spill cases and offer statutory remedies to private citizens experiencing impacts
from an oil spill. These five acts are: the Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1501-1524
(Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1991); the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1801-1866 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.S. §§
1301-1356 (Law. Coop. 1980 & Supp. 1991); the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1431-1435 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991), 33 U.S.C. §§ 14011445 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1991); and the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.S. §§
401-467(e) (1988). Passage of the OPA affected, amended, or repealed portions of these
acts relating to oil spill damages and cleanup.
The Deepwater Port Act (DPA) regulates the operation of deepwater ports in waters beyond the territorial limits of the United States. Presently, only one deepwater
port operates in U.S. waters-in the Gulf of Mexico. The DPA authorizes citizens to
seek equitable relief for violations of the DPA. If a violation occurs, persons bringing
an action under the DPA may recover reasonable attorney's fees and expert witness
fees. Citizens may recover for damages to real or personal property, the marine and
coastal environment, and to all affected lands, fish, wildlife, and structures. 33 U.S.C. §
1515 (1988).
Congress repealed major portions of the Outer Continental Lands Shelf Act (OCSLA) in section 2004 of the OPA. 33 U.S.C. § 2004 (1988). Citizen suit provisions allowing enforcement of the OCSLA are found in the Submerged Lands Act (SLA). For
the most part, the SLA provides a framework for developing the Outer Continental
Shelf, studying the impacts of that development, and providing for ordered leasing and
permitting of OCS operations. Obtaining relief for oil spills or blowouts resulting from
OCS development would primarily be sought under the CWA, state laws, and now, the
OPA. However, the SLA provides that a private citizen with an affected interest may
sue to compel compliance with the SLA. A court may award reasonable attorney's and
expert witness fees to a private party bringing a suit under the SLA. 43 U.S.C. § 1349
(1988).
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) regulates and
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This part of the article provides only a limited discussion of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA) 84 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)8"
because these Acts do not apply to oil spills (although their names
imply otherwise). The focus in this part is on provisions in these federal acts that (1) allow for citizen suits; (2) give authority to persons
to bring claims for private property damages resulting from oil spills;
and, (3) allow recovery for other kinds of damages.
A.

CERCLA and RCRA

Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980."' Congress enacted CERCLA, in part, to (1) respond to hazardous waste disposal
problems; (2) deal with those responsible for disposing of hazardous
substances; and (3) inventory hazardous wastes.8 7 However, the use of
the word "comprehensive" in the title of CERCLA is somewhat misleading because CERCLA excludes petroleum and crude oil from its
definition of "hazardous substance." 88 Moreover, CERCLA does not
contain specific provisions for removing spilled oil, nor does it authorize a private citizen to sue an oil spiller for damages to private property."9 Instead, CERCLA references the Clean Water Act (CWA), °
which directs the government to prepare national contingency plans
provides for research of ocean dumping and transportation of waste material. The
MPRSA defines "material" to mean garbage and waste, and includes oil if taken
aboard a vessel for the purpose of dumping. The MPRSA authorizes civil suits by
private parties to enjoin any violations of the MPRSA. Parties bringing suit under the
MPRSA may be awarded attorney's and expert witness fees, but not damages to personal or real property. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988).
The Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA) while offering important protections for navigable waters and water pollution, does not contain provisions to allow private parties
to bring citizen suits to enforce the RHA. Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275
(D. Conn. 1976), aff'd mem. sub. nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573
F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977), sets forth an excellent analysis of the RHA's "citizen suit"
provision, holding that the RHA does not imply a private right of action. 421 F. Supp.
at 1278-82.
84. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9601-9675 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
86. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9601-9675 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
87. HR. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-20. CERCLA authorizes any "person" to commence a civil action against any person violating CERCLA's provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1988). A
party must give notice of a violation before filing suit and may not commence an action if the government is already pursuing action under CERCLA. Id. § 9659(d). "Person" includes the United States or any other governmental entity, individuals, and
business entities. Id. § 9601(21). See 40 C.F.R. § 302.6 (1991) for detailed information
on notice procedures and requirements.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33) (1988). Hazardous substance "does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance ...." Id. § 9601(14)(F).
89. Id. § 9605. See George Pendygraft et al., Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation,
21 IND. L. REV. 117 (1988).
90. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1991).
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to remove oil and hazardous substances."
Private plaintiffs also may attempt to sue under the Resource
Conservational Recovery Act (RCRA). 2 RCRA's citizen suit provisions allow damage recovery for solid waste discharges. 3 Since passage of the OPA, the terms of RCRA would not apply to oil spills."
OPA's comprehensive scheme of oil spill penalties and restoration is
the more appropriate statute to use in oil spill lawsuits.95
B. Clean Water Act
In 1972, Congress passed the CWA.9 Under section 505 of the
CWA,97 citizens may commence a civil action against a person violating any effluent standard or effluent limitation order issued by the
EPA or a state. 8 In addition, citizens may bring civil actions against
the EPA if the EPA fails to perform an act or duty required by the
CWA. 9 However, there is no provision in the CWA for private parties
to recover damages.
The CWA prohibits suits in two instances: (1) if a state or federal
government is commencing and diligently prosecuting the action
under relevant state or federal law," ° ' and (2) if the government has
issued a final order not subject to further judicial review and has as91. Id. § 1321 (oil and hazardous substance liability under the CWA). The CWA
is the federal law most relevant to oil spills because CERCLA excludes oil from its
coverage. See supra note 88. See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989); Faith Halter & Joel T. Thomas, Recovery of Damages by States for Fish and Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLoOY LQ 5
(1982).

92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988); see Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.
Cal. 1991) (once gasoline leaks it is a solid waste under RCRA).

93. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
94. It may be that oil spill removal falls under the comprehensive scheme for
pollution control in the CWA for pre-OPA spills. See 33 U.S.C.S. § 1321 (Law. Co-op.
1987 & Supp. 1991). See generally Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Hodel, 586 F.
Supp. 1163 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (conflicts between RCRA and Atomic Energy Act).
95. See infra Part VI(C). The OPA provides that the OPA is not to modify the

liabilities of any person under RCRA. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2718(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp.
1991).
96. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1991).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
98. Id. § 1365(a)(1). "Person" includes the United States or any other governmental instrumentality or agency. The CWA sets forth effluent standards and limitations at id. §§ 1311, 1316, 1317. The CWA allows a citizen to seek an action against
any "person" for violating effluent standards. Id. § 1365(f). This section sets forth
CWA's effluent standards very broadly. Similarly broad is the definition of person,
which includes "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, state, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a state, or any interstate body." Id. §
1362(5). Suits against a government agency are only permitted to the extent allowed
by the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. § 1365(a)(1). See
generally Steven Gaynor, Comment, The Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an
Interstate Water Pollution Case, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 257 (1988).

99. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988).
100. Id. § 1365(b)(1)(B). If the state or EPA is prosecuting a CWA compliance
action, citizens may still intervene as a matter of right to protect their interests. Id.
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sessed a penalty."1 Thus, private citizens may press CWA claims in
only a few instances.
Before filing a civil action under the CWA, the private party must
give notice of the alleged violation to either the state in which the
Reasonable
violation occurs or the EPA, and to the alleged violator.'
attorney and expert witness fees may be awarded to prevailing or substantially prevailing parties.' 3 The court also may require a bond or
other security if the private party seeks a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction. 4
The CWA does not limit citizen suits to past violations. 5 Instead, suit may be brought in cases where there is a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.' 6 The
primary purposes for enacting the citizen suit provision of the CWA
were to spur government cleanup of polluted water and to supplement
the government's enforcement actions using citizen suits.' 0 7 Environmental groups have brought some of the citizen suits authorized by
the CWA to enforce government-required water effluent standards
and to clean up already polluted waters.' 0 8 Because the CWA did not
comprehensively address oil spills, in 1990, Congress adopted a new
legislative scheme for the cleanup and the prevention of oil spills and
for the punishment of oil spillers.
C. Oil Pollution Act of 1990
In 1990, Congress passed the OPA. 09e The greatest impetus for
passage of the OPA was the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince
William Sound, Alaska." 0 To date, the OPA is the most comprehensive act dealing with oil spill liability and compensation.'
Under the
OPA, a vessel or facility discharging oil (or even threatening to dis101. Id. § 1319(g)(6)(iii).
102. Id. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
103. Id. § 1365(d). There is no provision for private recovery or economic damages
in the CWA.
104. Id.
105. See id. § 1365(g).
106. See Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 55
(1987). Citizens permitted to bring suits under CWA are those having an interest
"which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1988).
107. S REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3746-47.
108. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 78, at 183.
109. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 2701-2761 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
110. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
723. Congress suggested that oil spills were simply a cost of doing business because
payment for oil spill cleanup and damages were not greater than efforts to prevent
spills and develop appropriate cleanup techniques. Id. at 724.
111. See 3 AILEEN JENNER ET AL., 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 1 (7th ed. 1991) (Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 detailed commentary (Special Alert)); see also Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR L.J. 1 (1990);
Thomas J. Wagner, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis, 21 J. MAR L. & COM.
569 (1990).
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charge oil) onto navigable waters or adjoining shorelines is liable for
of oil and includes both
damages." '2 "Discharge" means any emission
113
intentional and unintentional oil spills.
Under the OPA, an oil spiller is liable for direct and indirect
damages resulting from the spill and the costs of cleaning up the
spill." 4 These costs and damages include oil removal costs, losses resulting from natural resource damages and destruction, and the costs
of assessing oil spill damages."' Damages also include injuries to real
or personal property and economic losses resulting from property
damage caused by a spill." 6 The OPA also allows private parties to
recover damages for lost revenues, profits, and earning capacity due to
injury, destruction, or loss of real and personal property and natural
resources caused by an oil spill.'1 7 At this point it is unclear whether
the OPA assists or hinders parties bringing common law damage
claims against an oil spiller.
The OPA limits the liability of parties responsible for oil spills to
the greater of (1) $1,200 per gross ton, (2) $10 million for vessels
greater than 3,000 gross tons, or (3) $2 million for vessels 3,000 tons or
less."' These limitations do not apply if the oil spill was proximately
caused by gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of federal
laws."' In addition, these limitations do not apply if the party responsible for an oil spill fails or refuses to report a spill, or fails to provide
reasonable cooperation and assistance concerning oil removal
activities. 20
The OPA sets forth several possible defenses to an oil spiller's
liability."' Defenses to liability for spills include (1) acts of God or
112. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2702(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The OPA defines "navigable
waters" to mean the "waters of the United States, including the territorial sea . ..."
Id. § 2701(21). The OPA applies to any oil spill incident and claims arising out of an
oil spill occurring on or after August 18, 1990. 43 U.S.C.S. § 1653(c)(14) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991).
113. 33 U.S.C.S § 2701(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). See 56 Fed. Reg. 43,534-01
(1991) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding oil spill response plans and
oil discharge removal equipment requirements); 57 Fed. Reg. 1139-01 (announcing the
establishment of the Oil Spill Response Plan Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
(OSRPNRC)).
114. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2702(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
115. Id. § 2702(b)(1)-(2)(A), (B).
116. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B). Any removal costs incurred by a private party must be
consistent with the national contingency plan. The OPA does not define "subsistence",
but subsistence users of natural resources may still be able to make claims for injury,
loss, or destruction of natural resources damaged by an oil spill. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
117. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(D), (E).

118. Id. § 2704(a)(1). Other vessels, deepwater ports, and offshore and onshore
facilities all have other separate liability limitations ranging from $600 per gross ton or
$500,000 for "other vessels" to $350 million for deepwater ports. Id. § 2704(a). Gross
tonnage means a vessel's approximate volume; net tonnage is the volume of the vessel's
cargo. 46 C.F.R. § 69.9 (1991).
119. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2704(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).

120. Id. § 2704(c)(2).
121. Defenses to liability are set forth at id. § 2703. The Act defines "responsible
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war, (2) acts or omissions of a third party not associated with the
spiller, and (3) gross negligence or willful misconduct of a damaged
claimant.'2 2 Even if the spiller has a valid defense, it may not escape
liability if it fails to report the spill or fails to provide cooperation and
assistance in cleaning up the spill.' 23
An important provision of the OPA is the establishment of a fund
to pay for oil removal costs, natural resource damage assessments, and
claims for uncompensated removal costs or damages.'" The oil spill
compensation fund established by the OPA has several purposes. One
purpose is to provide money for immediate cleanup activities. 2 ' Another purpose of the fund is to provide a source of compensation for
claims not paid by spillers because they have invoked a limitation or
defense; Congress sought to have the fund compensate oil spill victims, despite a spiller's legal liabilities.2 Further, the OPA fund is to
provide compensation in situations where an oil spiller is unknown or
judgment proof.' 27
The OPA amended the CWA in several ways, but did not change
the citizen suit provisions of the CWA.12 8 There are no specific "citizen suit" provisions in the OPA. This is probably because the OPA
establishes a mechanism to pay compensation to damaged private
parties. The CWA, on the other hand, is primarily an enforcement
statute. The fund established under the OPA supersedes the Fund established under the CWA to clean up oil spills. 29 The OPA increased
the liability limits as they formerly existed under the CWA.'3 0 The
monies in the OPA fund are available to pay a limit of $1 billion per
oil spill incident for removal costs and damages."3 '

party" to mean, in the case of vessels, "any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel." Id. § 2701(32)(A). The Act also defines the terms "onshore facility,"
"offshore facility," "deep water ports," "pipelines," "abandoned facilities," "ports,"
"pipelines," and vessels." Id. § 2701(32).
122. Id. § 2703(a), (b).
123. Id. § 2703(c).
124. Id. § 2712(a). However, a claimant must still present claims for removal costs
or damages to the responsible party first. Id. § 2713(a). The oil spill liability trust fund
is described at 26 I.R.C. § 9509 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The fund receives money
from taxes, oil spill damages, and penalties assessed under various federal acts. Id. §
9509(b). Congress used the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) as a
starting point for the OPA, particularly TAPAA's mechanism for establishing a fund
for reimbursing parties damaged by spills of oil shipped through the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline. 43 U.S.C.S. §§ 1651-1656 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991). See infra Part
VIII(A).
125. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2712(a)(1), (d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
126. Id. § 2712(a)(1), (4).
127. See S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (referring to S. 686), reprinted in,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 727.
128. See supra Part VI(B).
129. The CWA Fund was established at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1988). Section 2002
of the OPA repealed the CWA Contingency Fund. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2002.
130. See 33 U.S.C.S. § 1321(c)(5) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991).
131. 33 U.S.C.S. § 2712 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); 26 I.R.C. § 9509(c)(2) (Law. Coop. 1991).
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Congress only recently adopted the OPA. Therefore, courts have
not had the opportunity to test or apply provisions of the OPA to an
oil spill as of the date of this article.' 2
VII.
A.

LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE PARTY LAWSUITS

Limitation of Liability Act

The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (LLA) 3 3 allows a shipowner to restrict liability from the act of a vessel to the value of the
vessel. In part, the LLA provides that vessel owner liability is not to
exceed the value of the owner's interest in the vessel or in the vessel's
"freight then pending."' 34 To take advantage of the LLA, a vessel
owner must invoke the terms of the LLA, by filing an action in federal
court and depositing funds with the court equal to the owner's interest in the vessel or the vessel's freight.'1 If the vessel owner did not
know or have reason to know of the vessel's unseaworthiness or negligence in ship operations (if any), the LLA entitles the shipowner to
limit liability to the value of his interest in the vessel or the freight.' 36
Whether the LLA applies to private parties suing for damages
from an oil spill under state pollution laws is still not entirely clear.' 3

Available case law suggests that the LLA would apply in cases where
vessels spill oil which damages private property, with the exception of
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) oil spills in Alaska.'
132. The United States District Court in Alaska addressed the OPA in analyzing
oil spills in Alaska waters. See In re Glacier Bay (Glacier Bay II), 746 F. Supp. 1379,
1385 (D. Alaska 1990) (discussed infra Part VIII(C)). However, the court could not
apply the terms to the facts of that oil spill case because the OPA had not yet passed.
In addition, the OPA prohibits application of its terms to events before August 18,
1990. See 33 U.S.C.S. § 2751(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
133. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-195 (1988). A voluminous body of law describes the
LLA and its applications in greater detail than is available here. An excellent starting
point is GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed.
1975). See generally Fleming James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss
Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972).
134. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (1988).
135. Id. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 133, at 912-18; The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 134 (1894); Complaint of Caribbean Sea Transport, Ltd. v. Russo,
753 F.2d 948, 949-50 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussions of the term "freight then pending"
contained in 46 U.S.C. § 183(a)).
136. Id. § 183.
137. See generally David P. Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
27 (1981); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990). See also Chelentis v.
Luckenbach SS Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
204 (1917) (state recovery subject to general maritime law even though recovery sought
in state court).
138. In re Glacier Bay (Glacier Bay 11), 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990). See
Askew v. American Waterways Operators Inc., 411 US. 325 (1973) (upholding State
regulation of maritime oil spill). The effects of the LLA on liability of a shipowner for
oil spills have been the subject of much discussion. See, e.g., Alfred Avins, Absolute
Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOK. L. REV. 359 (1970); Allan 1. Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Pollution: Domestic and InternationalLaw, 38 GEO. WASH. L.REv. 1
(1969); Joseph C. Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Ocean, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1968).
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In In re Harbor Towing Corp.,'3 9 Harbor Towing filed an LLA
petition after an oil spill in Baltimore Harbor. The State of Maryland,
seeking reimbursement for cleanup costs, argued that the LLA provisions did not apply. 14 0 The federal district court, while recognizing
that the LLA's limited liability provisions would "not encourage shipown tortious
owners to proceed to engage in cleanup efforts after 4their
1
acts," allowed Harbor Towing to limit its liability.'
After Harbor Towing, the United States Supreme Court in Askew
v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,'4 addressed whether federal
pollution laws preempted the State of Florida from imposing its strict
liability pollution laws on an oil spiller.' 4 3 In Askew, several shipping
companies sought to prevent Florida from applying a state oil spill
prevention and pollution act. They argued that federal water quality
law preempted the state law.'" The Court held that there was no constitutional or statutory impediment to the State of Florida establishing any requirement or liability concerning the impact of oil spills on
Florida's interest or concerns.' 45 The Court went on to write:
"Whether the amount of costs [Florida] could recover from a wrongdoer is limited to those specified in the Act and whether in turn this
Act removes the pre-existing limitations of liability in the Limited Liability Act are questions we need not reach here."' 8 Thus, the Court
did not address whether the LLA applies to oil spill damages.
In In re Oswego Barge Corp., 4 ' a case similar to Harbor Towing,
Oswego Barge, which spilled oil in New York state waters, filed an
LLA action in federal court.'4 " The State of New York objected. The
State based its objections, in part, on its oil spill strict liability statutes.'4 9 The State attempted to distinguish Harbor Towing and argued that two federal circuit court decisions on the LLA should have
no applicability because both circuit decisions involved claims brought
under federal law regarding damage or impairment of piers on navigable waterways.' 0 In addition, New York argued that the limitation of
liability statute was anachronistic and, until repealed by Congress,
should be narrowly construed.'
The federal district court rejected New York's narrow construc139. 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
140. Id. at 1152.
141. Id. at 1157-58. The court concluded that the issue must be addressed by
Congress.
142. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
143. Id. at 332.
144. Id. at 328.

145. Id. at 332.
146. Id.
147. 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 312-13.
150. Id. at 316. See Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Ohio Valley Co., 510 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1975).
151. Oswego Barge, 439 F. Supp. at 319.
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tion and found the LLA still valid, but noted the growing concern
over oil spills and their devastating effects on the environment.' 52 In
addition, the court did not interpret the LLA to deny Oswego Barge
its protections.' 3 The court held that the LLA applied to15exempt
the
4
state's environmental claims against the barge company.
B. Robins Dry Dock: Limits on Economic Damage Claims Without
a Direct Physical Impact
In Robins Dry Dock, a vessel's charterer was required by a contract with the vessel owner to periodically turn over the vessel for repair. A dry dock company negligently damaged a vessel's propeller
while the vessel was in dry dock for repairs. 6 ' The charterer brought
an action for damages against the dry dock company, because, as a
result of the propeller damage, the vessel was unavailable for charter
for an additional two weeks.16 The charterer paid no hiring fees during the maintenance period, but sought to recover its expected profits
from the use of the vessel that it would earn during that time.
The United States Supreme Court held that the charterer lacked
a cause of action and denied recovery. 1" The Court reasoned that the
charterer was without a proprietary interest in the vessel, and, therefore, could not recover economic losses based on the dry dock's unintentional interference with charter contracts."6 8 The Robins Dry Dock
rule limited the plaintiff's recovery of foreseeable damages and precluded recovery for economic loss absent physical damage or injury to
plaintiff's property.'6 9
1. Historical Context and Background of Robins Dry Dock
The Justice Holmes authored-opinion in Robins Dry Dock was
the first United States Supreme Court pronouncement of a bright-line
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). The area of
limitation of liability and interaction between Robins Dry Dock and the LLA is a complex and lengthy body of law. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME
LAW § 13-7, at 472-73, and § 17-3, at 542-44 (1987) (economic losses and remote claims
and compensatory damages for oil spills); James W. Shephard, Comment, The Murky
Waters of Robins Dry Dock: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Loss in Maritime
Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 995 (1986) (general discussion, exceptions to, and historical development of the Robins Dry Dock rule). See generally Michael P. Sullivan, Annotation,
Robins Dry Dock Doctrine Limiting Recovery For Economic Losses Due To Uninten-

tional Maritime Torts, 88 A.L.R. FED. 295 (1988). For a thorough discussion of the
Robins Dry Dock rule, see David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss Under U.S.
Maritime Law: Sixty Years Under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157 (1987).
156. Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 307.
157. Id. at 309.
158. Id. at 308.
159. Id. at 309. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766(C) (1977) (generally
adopting the Robins Dry Dock rule).
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bar to recovery for economic damages.' 60 At least one court cites the
case as the basis of a per se rule against "recovery for economic loss
caused by an unintentional maritime tort absent physical 6 damage to
property in which the victim has a proprietary interest."' '
Justice Holmes concluded that the charterer lacked property
rights in the vessel, and that the charterer's loss arose solely from its
contract with the owner, not from any interest in the vessel.'6 2 Justice
Holmes wrote that the dry dock owners knew nothing of the charter
contract:
[N]o authority need be cited to show that . . . a tort to the
person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable
to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong ....The
law does not spread its protection so far.' 63
Though Justice Holmes cited no authority for this proposition, he
alluded to three cases that concerned claims for indirect economic
loss: Elliot Steam Tug v. The Shipping Controller,'6 Byrd v. English,'65 and The Federal No. 2. '1 Elliot Steam Tug, a case that allowed lost profits under a wartime indemnity statute, stated that economic loss might be recoverable under traditional tort rationales of
foreseeability or proximate cause, but stated the common law rule this
way:
The Charterer in collision cases does not recover profits, not
because the loss of profits during repairs is not the direct consequence of the wrong, but because the common law rightly or
wrongly does not recognize him as able to sue for such an injury
to his merely contractual rights.6
Justice Holmes' opinion in Robins Dry Dock does not directly address this question of "right or wrong" raised in Elliott Steam Tug's
dicta, though it seems to lurk in the background of his jurispru160. See E. John Heiser, Note, Recovery of Economic Losses: Robins Dry Dock
Remains a Dominant Force - Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 10 MAR. LAw.
283 (1985).
161. Amoco Transp. Co. v. S/S Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 1985).
See Shephard, supra note 155.
162. 275 U.S. at 308. Holmes wrote that if the charterers have a claim against
third parties, "it must be worked out through their contract relations with the owners,
not on the postulate that they have a right in rem against the ship." Id.
163. Id. at 309.
164. [1922] 1 K.B. 127 (C.A. 1921).
165. 43 S.E. 419, 421 (Ga. 1903) (holding that recovery for third-party economy
loss would encourage collusion, extravagant contracts, and a portentous system of
litigation).
166. 21 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir. 1927) ("damage suffered by one whose interest in
the party or thing is contractual is too remote for recovery.").
167. [1922] 1 K.B. at 140.
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dence. 6s Instead, Justice Holmes simply cites Elliot Steam Tug as a
basis for his bright-line approach in barring recovery for economic
damages. Interestingly, the Robins Dry Dock opinion and other early
American cases using the bright-line approach paralleled similar developments in English legal theory."6 9
2.

Factors Influencing Justice Holmes

The most apparent reason for Holmes' rigid rule is that, as
Professors Prosser and Keeton opined, the courts stand "more or less
in dread of a 'flood of litigation' involving problems which they are
not prepared to deal with. ' "'7 This concern may have been particularly acute at the time the Court decided Robins Dry Dock: when
courts were experimenting with and expanding the notions of foreseeability to extend the limits of liability for physical injuries.'
Justice
Holmes perhaps did not consider foreseeability rationale suitable in
the area of third-party economic damage, where repercussions of negligence might be far wider.' 72
Also, Justice Holmes advocated the private ordering of affairs
through contract and did not favor expansive notions of liability."' At
a basic level, Justice Holmes believed that "the loss from accident
must lie where it falls,"' 74 and that people could shift loss, or protect
against it, through insurance or contract.'
This view allowed Justice
Holmes to insist, as he did in Robins Dry Dock, that recourse for
third-party economic loss be resolved in advance by the parties who
fear, or simply perceive, the risk.
In addition, Justice Holmes believed that the law should have
predictive value so that persons could order their daily affairs with
some certainty. 76 Perhaps the law's predictive value would be lost if
recovery of economic damages was handled as a matter of foreseeability. Justice Holmes noticed the law's tendency to delineate arbitrarily

168. See infra Part VII(B)(2).
169. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 86-87 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941).
170. KEETON, supra note 24, § 4, at 23.
171. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.18A (2d ed. 1986). Physical consequences of negligence are usually limited, "but the indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended." Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
172. See id. and § 6.10, at 335 (footnote omitted) ("The multiplicity of actions
and the unforeseeable extension of liability may well have influenced the court in denying the charterer's claim, as a matter of policy, just as the fear of an infinity of
claims inhibits courts . . . in other cases involving purely economic loss.").
173. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15-17 (1974).

174. OLIVER W, HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co.
1881).
175. Id. at 96; see OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 182-83 (1920);
FREDERIC R. KELLOGG, THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 126 (1984).
176. LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL 217 (1991); HOLMES, supra note

174, at 167, 169.
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the bounds of recovery.' 77 He mirrored this tendency in Robins Dry
Dock.'
C.

Applications of Robins Dry Dock

Several courts have held that the Robins Dry Dock rule does not
prevent commercial fishermen from recovering for economic damages
caused by an oil spill. For example, in Pruitt v. Allied Chemical
Corp.,7 9 the court held a chemical company liable to commercial fishermen because the chemical Kepone dumped into Chesapeake Bay by
Allied Chemical rendered fish caught in the bay unmarketable. However, the fish buyers, who also lost profits because they could not sell
pollution-tainted fish, could not recover from the polluter.' 80 In
Pruitt, commercial fishermen, seafood wholesalers, distributors,
processors, retailers, bait shop owners, tackle suppliers, and restaurants all filed suit for economic damages; but only the fishermen recovered.'"' The court found that commercial fishermen were entitled
to compensation for lost profits, noting that the entitlement arises
from "a constructive property interest in the bay's harvestable species.""" The court also found that fishermen could recover for economic damages "despite any direct physical damage to their own

177. JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 28 n.27 (Harry C. Shriver ed. 1936);
supra note 174, at 68. Justice Holmes was probably influenced to some degree
by similar concurrent developments in English jurisprudence. Through at least one
letter from Frederick Pollack, Justice Holmes knew that the English courts were wrestling with the issue of open-ended liability for economic loss. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 169, at 86-87. Pollack also seemed opposed to alterations of any
bright-line rule. Id.
178. As a historical note, Justice Holmes authored Robins Dry Dock when he was
86, just a few years before he resigned from the bench. He did not cite the case or the
rule enunciated in Robins Dry Dock in any subsequent opinions, but he did express his
preference for narrow liability in the earlier case of Southern Pac. Co. v. DarnellTaenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918). The Court has cited Robins Dry
Dock only a few times since it was written. None of the subsequent cases in which it is
cited revisit the rationale of Justice Holmes' holding. In fact, the Court had the opportunity to revisit Robins Dry Dock in East River Steamship Corp. v. Trans Am. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 n.6 (1986), but chose not to do so.
179. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
180. Id. at 981-82. See Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Sterma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir.
1978).
181. Indeed, Congress and the courts have always been protective and solicitous of
fishermen in recovering damages. See 46 U.S.C. § 10601 (1988) (ensuring recovery of
fishermen's share of catch). The courts have also indicated favor for fishermen recovering economic damages. Trans Am. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. at 869 n.5; Emerson G.M.
Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468, 1472-74 (9th Cir. 1984) (economic loss
recoverable in admiralty strict liability actions when action brought by commercial
fishermen); Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, Inc., 581 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th
Cir. 1978) (fishing vessel owners and commercial fishermen may recover for lost fishing
profits); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974); Carbone v. Ursich,
209 F.2d 178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953) (recognizing a "special situation" of fishermen in a
"special rule" giving fishing vessel crew members recovery for lost profits resulting
from another vessel damaging a fishing net).
182. 523 F. Supp. at 978.
HOLMES,
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The Pruitt court found "itself with a perceived need to limit liability, without any articulable reason for excluding any particular set
of plaintiffs."' 84 The court struggled with deciding how to distinguish
one set of damaged plaintiffs that could recover (for example, commercial fishermen) from another class of plaintiffs who could not (for
example, seafood catchers, wholesalers, retailers, processors, distributors, restaurateurs, parties such as gear shops that sold to fishermen,
employees of these businesses, etc.).185 The court alluded to a desire to
avoid double counting damages.' 86 "Considerations both of equity and
social utility suggest that just as defendant should not be able to escape liability for destruction of publicly owned marine life entirely, it
should not be caused to pay repeatedly for the same damage."' 87 Ultimately, the court allowed fishermen to recover, but disallowed damages sought by seafood purchasers and marketers because they were
not sufficiently direct.'

Similarly, the court did not allow sportfishing interests to recover
damages because it characterized those damages as small and difficult
to establish.' 9 The court did allow boat shops, tackle shops, bait

shops, and marina owners to recover because damages to these parties
were "foreseeable."' 9 ° In part, the court found that those businesses
that operate on the "water's edge" or on the water itself had a closer
link to damages and, therefore, damage claims.'
Those plaintiffs
more removed from "direct" damages, such as onshore businesses that
purchased and marketed fish from commercial fishermen, would not
recover damages.' 8 The court also upheld this conclusion under admiralty law citing to Robins Dry Dock.'
Another important case that analyzes the limitations imposed by
Robins Dry Dock is Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank.' 4 The
M/V Testbank collided with another barge in the Mississippi River
spilling pentachlorophenol (PCP). As a result, the United States
Coast Guard closed the Mississippi River outlet to navigation and suspended all fishing in a 400-square mile area. Shipping interests, marinas, boat rental operators, seafood buyers, restaurants, tackle shops,
183. Id.
184. Id. at 980.
185. Id. at 979.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 980.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 982; see also Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th
Cir. 1978) which the Pruitt court relied upon in limiting recovery to commercial fishermen under Robins Dry Dock; but see In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D.
Alaska 1991) (questioning why recovery should be limited to commercial fishermen).
194. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
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bait shops, and recreational fishermen all filed suit against the owner
of the Testbank.'96
The Testbank plaintiffs argued that the rule of Robins Dry Dock
should be limited to interference with contract and should apply only
to losses suffered through an inability to perform contracts between
those parties claiming injury and other parties. 9 Still, the court rejected the plaintiff's arguments and affirmed the Robins Dry Dock
rule that plaintiffs who sustain no physical damage to property could
not recover purely economic damages against those responsible for the
spill. 97
Thus, cases such as Testbank that deny economic loss recovery,
absent physical damage, bolster the rule in Robins Dry Dock. 9 " However, the rule of Robins Dry Dock is becoming increasingly questioned, and in some cases, eroded by courts. In particular, claimants
who sue for damages for purely economic loss have seen some cases

195. Id. at 1020-21.
196. Id. at 1023.
197. Id. at 1023-26.
198. Another case applying Robins Dry Dock to commercial fishermen's damage
claims after an oil well blowout is Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)
(commercial fishermen recovery for Santa Barbara oil well blowout).
Our holding that the defendants are under a duty to commercial fishermen to
conduct their drilling and production in a reasonably prudent manner so as to
avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life is not foreclosed by the fact that the
defendants' negligence could constitute a public nuisance under California law....
The right of commercial fishermen to recover for injuries to their businesses
caused by pollution of public waters has been recognized on numerous occasions..
This injury must, of course, be established . . . [by showing] that the oil spill
did in fact diminish aquatic life, and that this diminution reduced the profits the
plaintiffs would have realized from their commercial fishing in the absence of the
spill. This reduction of profits must be established with certainty and must not be
remote, speculative or conjectural....
Finally, it must be understood that our holding in this case does not open the
door to claims that may be asserted by those, other than commercial fishermen,
whose economic or personal affairs were discommoded by the oil spill of January
28, 1969.... Nothing said in this opinion is intended to suggest, for example, that
every decline in the general commercial activity of every business in the Santa
Barbara area following the occurrences of 1969 constitutes a legally cognizable injury for which the defendants may be responsible. The plaintiffs in the present
action lawfully and directly make use of a resource of the sea, viz. its fish, in the
ordinary course of their business. This type of use is entitled to protection from
negligent conduct by the defendants in their drilling operations.
Id. at 570.
See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957
(5th. Cir. 1972) (gas production plant did not recover economic losses when large anchor
severed gas line because interference with gas pipeline's contract rights unintentional); Dick
Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979) (plaintiff's claim for damages arising out of damaged river locks on the
theory of negligent interference with business expectancy denied); Louisville and Nashville
R.R. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979) (railroad company denied recovery for economic expectancy after bridge negligently struck by vessel); see generally Joseph
J. Kalo, Water Pollution and Commercial Fishermen: Applying General Maritime Law to
Claims for Damages to Fisheries in Ocean and Coastal Waters, 61 N.C. L. REv. 313 (1983).
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reported in their favor.' 99 In addition, passage of the OPA, the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 00 and recent court decisions in the
Alaska federal district court, show a further eroding of the Robins Dry
Dock protections for defendants who spill oil.
VIII.

ALASKA OIL SPILL CASES

In July 1987, the oil tanker GlacierBay spilled about 150,000 gallons of oil from the Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) into Cook Inlet
near Kenai, Alaska. 0 1 The oil tanker Exxon Valdez went aground on
Bligh Reef near Valdez, Alaska, in March 1989.202 Litigation resulting
from these spills has resulted in three reported court cases from the
Alaska Federal District Court."'2 These cases involve applications of
the LLA, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA),
Robins Dry Dock, Alaska's strict liability statute, as well as claims by
many types of plaintiffs seeking damages resulting from these spills.
These two Alaska oil spills have also presented the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals with opportunities to address the limitations placed
on attempts to recover economic damages by private parties. Therefore, reviews of these cases are instructive.
A.

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act

Congress enacted the TAPAA in 1973.0" Under TAPAA, the
holder of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline system (TAPS) right-of-way is
strictly liable for all damages caused to lands, structures, and natural
resources affected by a spill of TAPS oil along the pipeline's right of
way.2"' If any damages remained beyond the limits set by Congress,
TAPAA directs claimants to seek remedies in court by providing that
"damages in excess of $50 million shall be in accord with ordinary
rules of negligence. 20 8
If a vessel spills TAPS oil, both the owner and operator of the
199. Kelly M. Hnatt, Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery, 73
IOWA L. REV. 1181 (1988); Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Business Interruption, Without Physical Damage, as Actionable, 65 A.L.R. 4TH 1126 (1988).
200. 43 U.S.C.S. §§ 1651-1655 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991).
201. In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1991).
202. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
203. In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991) afj'g, 741 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Alaska 1990); In re Glacier Bay (GlacierBay II), 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990);
In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991). District Court Judge Holland
wrote each of the district court opinions.
204. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988). See 43 C.F.R. § 29.3 (1991) (administration of
the Fund). The OPA amended or repealed several provisions of TAPAA. See 43
U.S.C.S. § 1653 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991) (liability for damages and amount to
be deposited in liability fund).
205. 43 U.S.C.S. § 1653(a)(1) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991). In these strict liability
situations under TAPAA, and prior to passage of the OPA, liability for spills was limited to $50 million for any one incident. Id. § 1653(a)(2).
206. Id. § 1653(a)(2).
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vessel are strictly liable, jointly and severally, for all damages and
cleanup costs.2"' TAPAA's damage recovery scheme limits the amount
that can be paid for all claims arising out of an oil spill to $100 million.2"' The vessel's owner and operator are jointly and severally liable
for the first $14 million of claims. The TAPAA Liability Fund is liable
for the balance of claims up to $100 million.209 If total claims exceed
$100 million, the claims are reduced proportionately. 1 ' Unpaid portions of any claims made against the TAPAA Fund could be asserted
under other state or federal law.2 "'
B.

Glacier Bay I

In In Re Glacier Bay (Glacier Bay I),2' the owner of the oil
tanker Glacier Bay filed an action in district court to limit its liability
under the LLA. 1 3 This motion was challenged on the grounds that
the TAPAA repealed application of the LLA to transportation of
TAPS oil.21"
The Alaska Federal District Court held, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed, that the LLA2"' did not apply to claims
made on spilled TAPS oil.21 The Ninth Circuit found that Congress
intended TAPAA "to become the controlling statute with regard to
trans-Alaska oil. '217 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit decided Congress implicitly repealed the LLA with respect to TAPS oil, when it
enacted TAPAA. 21 s The court of appeals found that the LLA "is contrary to every aspect of TAPAA. '' 21 9 In particular, the court noted
that applying the LLA to any aspect of TAPAA would frustrate
TAPAA's goal of comprehensive remedial damage payments to parties
harmed by an oil spill.22 0 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress
intended TAPAA and its strict liability and negligence provisions to
operate without limitation." '

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1988).
43 U.S.C.S. § 1653(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id.
741 F. Supp. 800 (D. Alaska 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991).

213. Id. at 801.
214. Id.
215. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (1988).
216. 741 F. Supp. at 803-04.
217. In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d at 583 (emphasis in original).
218. Id. The court's finding that Congress implicitly repealed the Limitation of
Liability Act when it passed TAPAA was primarily based on the reasoning found in
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976).
219. In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d at 583.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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C. Glacier Bay II
In a later case arising from the same oil spill, In re Glacier Bay
(Glacier Bay II),222 the Alaska Federal District Court reiterated that
TAPAA pre-empted the use of the LLA for spills of TAPS oil.223 Having held in Glacier Bay I that the federal LLA did not apply to limit
the liability of a vessel's owners for damages, the court faced private
party damage claims in Glacier Bay H.22" The two primary substantive issues the district court addressed in Glacier Bay II were: (1)
whether fishermen's claims could be compensated under TAPAA and
Alaska's oil spill strict liability statute and, (2) whether business
losses of non-fishermen were compensable damages under TAPAA
and Alaska's strict liability law. 25
The court held that maritime law applied because the Glacier
Bay oil spill was a maritime tort; it occurred on navigable waters and
bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities."' Ultimately, the district court held that parties could recover "all provable damages.""22 Moreover, damages were recoverable without evidence of physical harm under either the State of Alaska's strict
liability statute or TAPAA.2 2 s This result emerged because TAPAA
provided, in part, that TAPAA's fund "'shall be strictly liable without
regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection for
all damages, including clean up costs, sustained by any person or entity . . ' "29 The court interpreted this section of TAPAA to "mean
what the plain language of that statute says: all damages sustained by
any person as a result of an oil spill."23 The court also turned to language in the OPA that addressed oil spill damages.2 3 1 Section 8102(c)
of the OPA amended TAPAA to indicate that claims against
TAPAA's fund for damages shall include, but not be limited to
(A) the net loss of taxes, revenues, fees, royalties, rents, or
other revenues incurred by a State or a political subdivision of a
State due to injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal
property, or natural resources, or diminished economic activity
due to a discharge of oil; and

222. 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990).
223. Id. at 1382.
224. Id.
225. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1991).
226. Glacier Bay II, 746 F. Supp. at 1383. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Robert M. Hughes, III & D. Arthur Kelsey, Toxic
and Environmental Torts Within Admiralty, 62 TUL. L. REV. 405 (1988).
227. Glacier Bay IH, 746 F. Supp. at 1386.
228. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1991); 43 U.S.C.S. § 1653(c) (Law. Co-op. 1980 &
Supp. 1991); Glacier Bay II, 746 F. Supp. at 1386-87.
229. Glacier Bay 11, 746 F. Supp. at 1384 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1988)
(emphasis added by court).
230. Id. at 1385.
231. Id.
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(B) the net cost of providing increased or additional public
services during or after removal activities due to a discharge of
oil, including protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, incurred by a State or political subdivision of a State.2 3
The court held that this amendment to TAPAA by the OPA clarified
"that certain actual damages perceived by Congress to have been incurred as a result of the more recent Exxon Valdez TAPS oil spill
were indeed recoverable damages,
although clearly beyond the scope
'2 33
of the Robins Dry Dock rule.
The district court's opinion in Glacier Bay II may be an in-road
into damage claim limits established by the Robins Dry Dock rule.23 '
However, the opinion may be of limited usefulness in non-TAPS oil
spills outside Alaska because the Glacier Bay II court based its decision in part on TAPAA, which authorizes claims to be brought against
an oil spiller, and in part on Alaska's strict liability oil spill statute.
D.

Exxon Valdez

Recently, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and others
23
presented the Alaska Federal District Court in In re Exxon Valdez 5
with a motion for judgment on the pleadings against plaintiffs seeking
economic damages because of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Alyeska argued that the plaintiffs' claims for economic losses did not have a requisite physical impact or injury as required by both maritime law and
Robins Dry Dock. The plaintiffs seeking damages were boat charterers, taxidermists, fishing lodges, sportfishermen, photographers, kay236
akers, fish processors, and fish tenders.
The Exxon Valdez court first held that the Exxon Valdez oil spill
was a maritime tort because it occurred on navigable waters and bore
a significant relationship to maritime activity, and therefore, maritime
law applied. 37 Having established admiralty jurisdiction, the court
addressed the damage claims of shoreside businesses .2 " The court
found that under the Admiralty Extension Act, 23 9 the Exxon Valdez
232. Id. at 1385 (quoting 43 U.S.C.S. § 1653(c)(13) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).
233. Id. at 1385. See also 43 C.F.R. § 29.1 (1989) (TAPAA's implementing regulations defining damages broadly).
234. See supra Part VII(B) for a discussion of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.

Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).

235. 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991).
236. Id. at 1511 (collectively called "area businesses" and "use and enjoyment
plaintiffs").
237. Id. at 1511-12. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 863-64 (maritime nexus
requirement); Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 268 (relationship to traditional maritime activity). See also Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 318 n.7 (1960) (tort action
on navigable waters is within exclusive reach of maritime law).
238. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1512.
239. Id.; 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988). "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damages or injury, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage
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oil spill proximately caused "the shore-based damage claims, thereby
"...240
Because maritime
subjecting them to admiralty jurisdiction .
law applied to the plaintiffs' damage claims, it did not matter to the
court whether the plaintiffs claimed damages under state common law
or state statutory strict liability.2 1 The court then held that Robins
Dry Dock and maritime2 4 law applied to all tort claims except those
based on strict liability. ,
In analyzing TAPAA and Alaska's strict liability statute, the
court first indicated that the Alaska law was a valid attempt to "protect the safety of its citizens, their property, and the state's natural
resources by regulating the release of hazardous substances. '243 The
court then concluded that Alaska's strict liability statute was similar
to TAPAA because TAPAA imposed strict liability on spillers of
TAPS oil up to $100 million. 244 The court wrote:
In the limited situation such as this case where the oil spill
was of TAPS oil, the Alaska Act and TAPAA do not conflict to
the extent of $100 million. For the first $100 million of damage
resulting from a TAPS oil spill, the remedy would be uniform
whether claims were brought under TAPAA or the Alaska Act. A
conflict does not2surface until a TAPS oil spill exceeds $100 million in damages. 5
The court indicated that if plaintiffs claim damages in excess of
TAPAA's $100 million liability limitation, Robins Dry Dock would apply to limit additional damages because the applicable law is general
maritime law. The court further held that to the extent state law supplements federal maritime law, plaintiffs could recover up to $100 million in recoverable damages.246 Thereafter, Alaska's strict liability
statute could not be effective to avoid federal damage limitations law
under Robins Dry Dock."" Moreover, TAPAA2 48 could not be inter-

or injury be done or consummated on land." Id.
240. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1512.
241. Id. at 1513-14.
242. Id. at 1514.
243. Id. The state statute was valid because it did not conflict with federal law
and was concurrent with federal maritime law. Id.
244. Id. at 1515; 43 U.S.C.S. § 1653(c) (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991). The $100
million ceiling in TAPAA, "as specific federal maritime legislation, displaces the general maritime law, including the rule of Robins Dry Dock, regarding strict liability."
Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515.
245. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515 (footnote omitted). The "Alaska Act"
referred to in the court's decision is ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1991). The court wrote:
"This was essentially the ruling in [Glacier Bay III. The court did not elaborate on the
basis for that ruling because the parties in [Glacier Bay IIlrepresented to the court
that damages did not exceed $100 million." 767 F. Supp. at 1515.
246. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515.
247. Id.
248. The court specifies 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9) (1988), which states that this subsection "shall not be interpreted to preempt the field of strict liability or to preclude
any State from imposing additional requirements." Id.
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preted as relieving states from limits imposed by maritime law.24 9 Exxon Valdez plaintiffs' efforts to invoke the state's strict liability statute on damages are still subject to TAPAA's $100 million limitation.
To hold otherwise, the court believed that Congress would have had
to specifically intend to allow state strict liability statutes to impose a
higher limit, a limit higher than TAPAA specifically allows and higher
than that which Robins Dry Dock would allow.2 50 "Robins Dry Dock
applies to limit the damages recoverable under the Alaska Act in excess of $100 million recoverable under TAPAA."' '5
The court continued that despite the disclaimer of the Ninth Circuit in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen"5 ' of "any intention to disavow Robins
Dry Dock except for commercial fishermen, this court does not understand how, as a matter of principle, the rule in Robins Dry Dock can
have application for all claimants who suffer economic loss as a result
of a marine tort except commercial fishermen."2 3 The court pointed
out to the Ninth Circuit that its interpretation of Robins Dry Dock is
open to some question that could "have implications of... monumen'
tal proportions."254
The court assumes without knowing that there are thousands of
commercial fishermen's claims involved in this litigation. Even if
Oppen remains the law of the Ninth Circuit, this court and the
Superior Court for the State of Alaska are confronted with a substantial number of economic loss claims. This court and, since it
is bound to follow federal admiralty law as well, the Superior
Court of Alaska urgently need to know whether and to what extent the rule of Robins Dry Dock will apply to the economic
claims of those who are not commercial fishermen."'
The District Court urged the Ninth Circuit to "take this matter
up immediately" because, the Exxon Valdez oil spill presented the
District Court with a substantial number of economic loss claims.25
Those parties who are not commercial fishermen but who have claims
for economic loss would be affected by the Ninth Circuit's decision.
In Glacier Bay H, the court seems to have ruled that all provable
damages by any person were recoverable and not limited by Robins
Dry Dock because damages in the Glacier Bay oil spill did not exceed
$100 million.2" 7 From this, one might conclude that pre-OPA plaintiffs
suing in admiralty for TAPS oil spill damages could recover up to
249. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515.
250. Id. at 1515-16.
251. Id. at 1516.
252. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (see supra note 198).
253. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1518.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not take the matter up immediately.
257. See Glacier Bay II, 746 F. Supp. at 1386; Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at
1515 n.6.
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$100 million in damages under either TAPAA, a state's statute making a spiller strictly liable for oil spill damages, or both. Applying the
Glacier Bay H court's reasoning to post-OPA spills, recovery for any
oil spill's damages might be limited to $500 million. Under the OPA,
the "maximum amount which may be paid from the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund with respect to ... natural resource damage assessments
and claims in connection with any single incident shall not exceed
$500,000,000." ' 18 This amount is available even if the oil spilled is
TAPS oil.25
One important conclusion of the Glacier Bay II decision is that
under TAPAA, Congress intended to compensate all "victims" of
TAPS oil spills under TAPAA, notwithstanding the rule of Robins
Dry Dock. 6 ' The United States District Court for the District of California used analysis contrary to that applied in Glacier Bay H when it
6
wrote that TAPAA incorporated the rule of Robins Dry Dock.' ' The
California District Court denied recovery to a group of California
plaintiffs who sought damages from Exxon defendants for increased
262
gasoline prices following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's Benefiel decision
but did not rule on the Robins Dry Dock issue.26 3 Instead, in dicta, the
Ninth Circuit indicated that the gas price issue was one of proximate
cause, writing that the "spill itself did not directly cause any injury to
1-264 The Court of Appeals believed that the proxithe appellants ....
mate reason for increased gasoline prices derived from intervening
events.' 6 As such, causation for plaintiff's alleged damages could not
be reasonably established and thus was a decision of proximate cause
for the court to make, which dismissed plaintiff's complaint."'
When the Ninth Circuit renders its decision in Exxon Valdez, it
will be faced with the Alaska District Court's decision in Exxon
Valdez that TAPAA "displaces the general maritime law, including
the rule of Robins Dry Dock"' 7 and language from Glacier Bay II
that "all provable damages sustained by any person as a result of a
TAPS oil spill are compensable ..2.6."8 It is likely that the Ninth
Circuit will disagree with the Alaska District Court. In its most recent
decision involving TAPAA, the Ninth Circuit wrote that "Congress
258. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
259. See 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(14) (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991).
260. 746 F. Supp. at 1386.
261. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251 (July 27, 1990).
262. Id. at 2.
263. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5019 (Mar. 24, 1992).
264. Id. at 5.
265. Id. These intervening events included the Coast Guard's closing of Port
Valdez, decisions by western oil refineries to raise prices instead of using oil reserves to
make up for any crude oil shortages, and decisions by distributors, wholesalers, and
retailers to pass on price increases. Id.
266. Id.
267. 767 F. Supp. at 1515.
268. 746 F. Supp. at 1386.
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envisioned damages arising out of the physical effects of oil discharges," and that "remote and derivative damages . . . fall outside
the zone of danger against which Congress intended to protect when it
passed TAPAA."26 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit is probably unlikely to allow parties to claim damages if they have suffered only economic losses from the Exxon Valdez oil spill without physical effects.
At this point, it is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit will base its decision on proximate cause analysis or principles of maritime common
law and Robins Dry Dock.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Private parties have a wide array of legal theories to use to bring
suit against oil spillers. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provides additional remedies to plaintiffs and a pool of money that private parties
can attempt to use to seek compensation after an oil spill. Yet, given
the large number of plaintiffs aggressively seeking damages after an
oil spill, the complexity of the law regarding private party lawsuits,
and the limited funds available to private parties under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the amount of payment on damages may be less than
the claim and may be slow in coming.270 Private parties seeking damages in court will face an expensive, time-consuming process, notwithstanding Congressional attempts at "prompt compensation." '" 7 ,
Private parties damaged by a spill should not, however, ignore an
opportunity to present a claim for damages directly to the spiller
before making claims against an oil spill recovery fund or before filing
suit."27 As demonstrated after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, if a party
damaged by an oil spill presents documented claims to an oil spiller,
the spiller may be very willing to settle the claim. Ultimately, this
method prevents further hardship to the claimant and reduced costs
to the spiller.27 3
269. Benefiel, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 5019, at 5 (emphasis added).
270. Ostensibly, the TAPAA Fund was set up with strict liability language to ensure "that trans-Alaska oil spill victims receive prompt compensation without resort to
prolonged litigation." In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 1991).
271. Id.
272. For example, an oil spiller might be inclined to compensate parties harmed
out of court for damages that a party could not recover in court. Parties such as taxidermists, businesses, and others that have no legal grounds (or "shaky" grounds at
best) for obtaining damages from a court might be better off seeking a damage settlement with the spiller in this manner. See, e.g., those parties set out in Part IV, supra.
Through these settlements, the oil spiller avoids negative publicity, might gain positive
publicity for attempting to rectify the situation with the damaged public, and the
claimant receives payment.
273. This method also avoids negative publicity a spiller faces in the media. For
example, after the Exxon Valdez spill, Exxon implemented an extensive claims process. By April 1990, one year after the spill, it had made more than 23,800 payments
on more than 11,400 claims to more than 10,000 claimants. Affidavit of Richard T.
Harvin, In re Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, No. 3AN-89-2533CI (Alaska Super.
Ct. Apr. 19, 1990), at T 2. The Exxon claims program had made payments of over $212
million on those claims. Id. Exxon set up claims offices in towns affected by the spill
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At the time of this article, the Ninth Circuit had not rendered its
opinion in the Exxon Valdez case.2 ' Clearly, the concept that Robins
Dry Dock limits damage claims to only those who have suffered physical impact from an oil spill and to commercial fishermen troubled
Judge Holland.'7 5 In interpreting Robins Dry Dock, Judge Holland
seemed to be searching for a way to convince the Ninth Circuit that it
should clarify its ruling in Oppen, if not completely overrule Oppen.
The dichotomy in the rule appears to trouble Judge Holland by allowing commercial fishermen to recover for economic damages while
denying recovery to others who make similar claims for economic
damages. 76
Judge Holland recognized that the consequences of a decision expanding the ability of non-fishermen to recover economic damages
was "monumental. 2 77 But Judge Holland also hints that if it were left
to him, he would allow all types of private parties (onshore and offshore, fisherman and non-fishing businesses) to recover damages. The
bases for his allowing recovery would probably be the Admiralty Extension Act,2 78 TAPAA, 79 and Alaska's strict liability statute.28
The theory of Robins Dry Dock seems as sound today as it did
when Justice Holmes first developed it in 1927. Parties facing economic damages can insure themselves against those potential damages. To hold an oil spiller responsible for damage claims by a myriad
of parties suffering what they claim are economic damages, without
any oil physically impacting them, would indeed open the courts up to
monumental numbers of additional lawsuits. What, for example,
would prevent parties watching scenes of an oil spill on television
from suing for the psychic or emotional damages they suffer in seeing

(including Kodiak, Valdez, and Homer, Alaska) and in cities with individuals affected
by the spill (e.g. Anchorage and Seattle). Exxon established meetings with affected
constituencies (including fishermen's groups and municipalities) to learn of their con5, 6.
cerns and attempt to respond to them. Id. at
An additional response effort that spillers can use after an oil spill is to hire those
parties that may have been affected by the spill, to work on spill cleanup and response.
This benefits potential claimants by giving them a job. For example, if fishermen are
prevented from fishing because of closed areas due to a spill, the spiller could hire
them to work on a cleanup. The spiller benefits by having access to skilled local labor.
The spiller also benefits because if the person hired by the spiller sues the spiller for
lost income from the spill, the claimant's wages should be deducted from any awards
as mitigation setoff. Exxon paid more than $220 million to charter fishing vessels for
oil spill cleanup work. Id. at 11. At least one court notes the tremendous efforts of
Exxon in compensating claimants, attempting to clean up an oil spill, and paying civil
and criminal fines in the billions of dollars. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, Nos.
90-2832 to -2841, 90-2857, 90-2946 to -2954, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 833 at *3.4 (7th
Cir. Jan. 24, 1992).
274. 767 F. Supp. at 1509.
275. Id. at 1518.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See supra note 239.
279. See supra note 245.
280. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515.
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wildlife harmed or waters sullied? The Alaska Federal District Court's
deference to Congress's determination that limits of liability in oil
spill situations should be legislatively decided is sound.2 " The kinds
of political decisions necessary in determining how far liability for an
oil spill should extend should be made by the body politic, and not
the courts.

281. Other courts reached the same conclusion in different circumstances. See In
re Harbor Towing, 335 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D. Md. 1971); In re Oswego Barge, 439 F.
Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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